Abstract --Symmetric end-to-end encryption requires separate keys for each pair of communicating confidants. This is a problem of Order Nz. Other factors, such as multiple sessions per pair of confidants and multiple encryption points in the I S 0 Reference Model complicate key management by linear factors. Public-key encryption can reduce the number of keys managed to a linear problem, which is good for scaleability of key management, but comes with complicating issues and performance penalties.
The items to be distributed must be communicated to the recipients in a tamper-proof manner. The complexity factor per confidant (G), which is due to this general nature of key management, can vary with implementation. To simplify analysis, assume that this complexity per confidant does not increase significantly as the number of confidants increase (as in a single database).
End-to-end session encryption requires separate keys for confidentiality between each pair of communicating confidants [3] . This is a combinatoric counting problem of N things taken 2 at a time. The general formula to compute . They strived to reduce this complexity by using public-key encryption, but at the time did not have a practical method to ensure authenticity of public keys.)
Each and any pair of communicating confidants can have multiple sessions (file transfer, virtual terminal, interprocess communication, etc.) proceeding simultaneously. Let S be the average number of simultaneous sessions requiring a key set, per pair of communicating confidants.
If end-to-end encryption is present at several layers of the IS0 model (see Tanenbaum [6] for a description of the IS0 Reference Model), each instance of end-to-end encryption may require a separate set of keys. Let K be the number of different key sets required per session, for a given cryptosystem due to encryption at multiple communication protocol layers.
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In The total number of key sets required is 2 order to manage a predetermined key pair for each potential session, the overall complexity of the key management problem with respect to the number of confidants is C, GSK( N 2 -N ) 2 where C = G, S, and K are constants, not dependent on N, in the above formula. The key management complexity, C, is a problem of Order Nz.
The key management technique discussed in the balance of this paper, as limited by the definition of key management earlier in rhis paper, will convert the key management complexity problem to a problem of Order N.
Technique
What is presented in this paper is a hybrid encryption system. This in itself is not new [5] . Hybrid encryption systems have been proposed in the past as a way to speed up encryption while still taking advantage of the convenience offered by public-key cryptosystems. The authors recognize the value of this, but also wish to point out how public-key authentication can be used to control the key management complexity problems associated with classical cryptosystems. The technique presented here uses keys for the proposed Digital Signature Standard ( D S S ) [l], which does not provide secrecy, with public-key encryption to exchange a session key for a symmetric encryption algorithm. This technique also offers the flexibility to insert the encryption algorithms appropriate to the specific circumstances, based on application requirements and various cryptosystem design trade-offs. For example, since symmetric encryption algorithms typically have higher encrypted data throughput rates than public key algorithms, the session key for a fast symmetric encryption algorithm can be exchanged, in order to satisfy throughput performance requirements of today's high speed computer communication networks.
Once a method for assuring authenticity such as the Digital Signature Standard is in place, the type of public-key encryption (RSA, Diffie-Hellman, etc.) and if necessary, a public key (possibly generated specifically for this session) can be signed and transmitted. Next a symmetric, session encryption algorithm can be selected and a session key can be generated and encrypted for transport using the specified public-key encryption algorithm and key. Once the session algorithm and session key is known to both confidants, the selected symmetric encryption algorithm can be used to rapidly encrypvdecrypt the message traffic for this session. A specific implementation in which the Digital Signature Standard is used in conjunction with Difie-Hellman publickey encryption to exchange a session key to a symmetric encryption algorithm will now be described.
Each confidant participating in this system must generate a pair of keys (one private, one public) suitable for use with the Digital Signature Standard. The public key, along with information to identifj the confidant, shall be registered with a central authentication entity. The central authentication entity will also have a pair of DSS keys. The public key of the central authentication entity should be published, well known, and easily accessible. This deters spoofing as this main, public key can be verified through numerous independent means.
For each session, each member of a communicating pair (Alice and Bob) will generate a keyexchange key in the manner of Diffie-Hellman. In order to create this key, each confidant would request a certified copy of his partner's public DSS key. Each confidant validates his partner's public DSS key using the DSS certificate and the wellknown, public DSS key of the certifying entity. Now that the each of the communicating confidants has an authentic copy of the other's public DSS key, he can raise it to the power of his own private DSS key, mod p, where p is one of the common and public parameters of the Digital Signature Having computed a keyexchange key K, one confidant now selects or calculates a session key. This session key would be signed by Alice with her DSS key and then encrypted using K as a key to whatever symmetric encryption algorithm (DES, one time pad, etc.) has been selected for use in this system. When Bob receives the message containing the session key, he will first decrypt it using K and the symmetric algorithm, then he will validate the signature using Alice's public DSS component. After validation, to assure no tampering has occurred, Bob signs a message acknowledging receipt of the session key, and sends this to Alice. This acknowledgement does not necessarily need to be encrypted.
With the session key successfully exchanged and authenticated (after detection and recovery from potential tampering), private communication between Alice and Bob can now take place. The sending confidant can DSS) a message to assure authenticity. Next, he could encrypt the signed message using the exchanged session key, to achieve privacy. Now the message can be transmitted over an insecure communication channel, as shown in figure
1.
The receiving confidant decrypts the incoming message with the session key to "remove the privacy envelope." He then validates the digital signature of the message with the sending confidant's public DSS key (exchanged at the start of the session) to veri@ authenticity. At the end of the session, all session keys can be destroyed, unless the receiving confidant wishes to be able to verify the authenticity of a received document or message at a later time. By the receiver retaining the sending confdant's DSS key from this session (as obtained from the central authentication entity) along with the decrypted message, the receiver can verify (or re-vere) the signature at any time without having to determine which signature key was valid at the time of the original transmission.
Conclusions
Each confidant in the system would only have to register one key with the central authentication entity. That entity would manage N keys, where N is the number of codidants in the system. S and K will have the same values as stated earlier sign (using to represent the average number of sessions and the number of key sets per session. The factor due to general key management complexity (G) would not increase by adding the described encryption technique to a system already providing digital signature service. "Hot lists" related to encryption are no longer necessary, since encryption keys are used only for the current session. Likewise, it is not necessary to track which encryption keys were valid during what period of time, since any keys generated were used specifically for this session. It is only necessary to track the validity (history) of the DSS keys if they are used to provide authenticity for the data message traffic of this session. By definition the central authentication entity should always have the current DSS public component for each registered confidant. The only public key or DSS public component that needs to be checked to ensure it is current, is the public component of the central authentication entity's DSS key.
As stated earlier, this should be published, well known, and easily accessible. When a public key authentication system is used to exchange session variables, the overall complexity of the key management problem with respect to the number of confidants is C, where now C = GSKN, since only N public authentication variables must be maintained.
With G , S, and K independent of N in the above formula, and the complexity due to the number of confidants being reduced to N (regardless how many different pairs of them are communicating at any time), the overall complexity of the key management problem is linear. This will lend itself to scaling for large, high speed, communication networks because the key management complexity is not a function of the speed of the communications network and because the overhead attributable to the number of participants can be kept linear rather than exponential.
The Digital Signature Standard is (or will soon be) a national standard that provides an authentication mechanism which can be used for the exchange of cryptographic variables for public-key cryptosystems. Since the Digital Signature Algorithm does not provide secrecy, but may already be in use by a system for signature purposes, we recommend (although this method does not require) using the DSS keys in a Difie-Hellman public-key encryption algorithm to encrypt the exchange of session keys used for classical encryption. This also avoids the possibly of maintaining separate key registries for signature and encryption keys. Now, by combining the Digital Signature Standard, public-key encryption (for key exchange), and classical session encryption, the means are available for scalable, high speed encryption and digital signature services between confidants who have never before communicated with each other. The general technique described in this paper provides for 1) flexibility regarding the choice of public-key encryption method for exchanging session key information, 2) allows dynamic generation and exchange of public-key cryptographic variables for session key exchange, 3) flexibility regarding the choice of session encryption method, and 4) dynamic generation and exchange of session keys, all with order N key management complexity.
